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The question whether a corporation can be an "inhabitant" of
any State other than that of its creation was discussed in United
States v. Southern Pacific R. B?. Co. et al., 491 Fed. Rep. 297.
The United States brought a bill in equity in the Northern
District of California against the Southern Pacific R. R. and
others; a motion was made to dismiss on the ground that the
act of March 3, 1887, defining the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts of the United States requires that wherever the suit is
not founded on diverse citizenship original process must be
served upon the defendant in the district of which he is an "inhab-
itant" ; and that the Southern Pacific Co., one of the defendants
to the bill, was a corporation of Kentucky, and could not therefore
be an "inhabitant" of California within the meaning of the stat-
ute, although it had agents there to accept process. Mr. Justice
Harlan, sitting at circuit decided the case as follows: "The Court
is of the opinion that the clause in the first section of the act of
x887, requiring suits to be brought in the district of the residence
either of the plaintiff or of the defendant where jurisdiction is
founded only on diversity of citizenship, applies only to suits in
which the parties, whether natural or artificial persons, are 'c iti-
zens of different States,' and cannot apply to suits brought by the
United States." * * * "The question therefore, to be
determined is whether a corporation created by the laws of
another State, but doing business here, and having its agents
located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, may not,
within the meaning of the statute, be deemed an ' inhabitant ' of
this State and district. Numerous cases have been cited by the
counsel of defendants as showing that a corporation of one State
is an inhabitant only of the State creating it. Upon a careful
examination of those cases, the Court is of opinion that no one of
them determines the precise question now before it. The cases
cited in argument establish these principles: i. While a corpo-
ration is domiciled in the State by whose laws it was created, its
legal existence in that State may be recognized elsewhere; so
that, within the scope of its limited powers, it may make and
enforce contracts in other States which are not forbidden by the
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laws of such States. * * * 2. For the purposes of jurisdiction
in the courts of the United States, a corporation is to be deemed
a citizen of the State creating it,. and no averment to the contrary
is permitted. * * * 3. A corporation of one State, by engag-
ing in business or acquiring property in another State, does not
thereby cease to be a citizen of the State creating it (Insurance
Co. v. Francis, ii Wall. 21o) ; although while the act of 1875 was
in force, it could be 'found' in any State where it did business
regularly by its agents, process being served upon such agents.
* * * In some of the cases cited there are general expressions
upon which much stress is laid by counsel. * * Those cases
undoubtedly hold that a corporation cannot throw off its alle-
giance or responsibility to the State which gave it existence, and
that its primary, legal domicile or habitation,-that is, its citizen-
ship,-is in such State ; consequently, for the purposes of suing
and being sued in the Courts of the United States, it is to be
deemed a citizen of the State by whose laws it was made an arti-
ficial person. But neither those cases, nor any case in the
Supreme Court of the United States, directly decides that a cor-
poration may not, in addition to its primary, legal habitation or
home in the State of its creation, acquire a habitation in, or
become an inhabitant of, another State, for purposes of business,
an. of jurisdiction in personam. It is eminently just that the
defendants, not corporations of this State, should be regarded as
inhabitants of this district for purposes of jurisdiction. Each of
them is under a duty, imposed by the Constitution of this State, to
have and maintain an office or place here for the transaction of its
business. * * * If it be said that inhabitancy in a State, in
its strict legal sense, implies a permanent, fixed residence in that
State, the answer is that a corporation of one State, operating, by
agents, a railroad or telegraph line in another State, with its con-
sent, or under its license, may be regarded as permanently identi-
fied with the business and people of the latter State, and, for the
purposes of its business there, to have a fixed residence within its
limits. * * * It seems to the Court that a corporation of a
State, or a corporation of the United States, holding such close
relations with the business and people of another State, may,
within a reasonable interpretation of the act of 1887, be deemed
an ' inhabitant' of the latter State for all purposes of jurisdiction
in personam by the courts held there; although a corporation is,
and, while its corporate existence lasts, 'must remain, a 'citizen'
only of the State which gave it life." In a succeeding case
decided in the Circuit Court of Oregon the same way (Gilbert v.
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New Zealand Ins. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 885), Deady, District Judge,
refers to 38 Fed. Rep. 273, 40 Fed. Rep. i, and 42 Fed. Rep. 465.
as opposed to the doctrine of this case.
The Supreme Court of the United States has of late made
some very fine distinctions upon the never ending question of
"What amounts to a regulation of Inter-State Commerce?" In
Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217, which was noticed
in the February number of the JOURNAL, the difference between
directly taxing gross receipts and levying a tax based upon the
gross receipts of a previous year was the turning point of the
decision. Now comes Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District,
decided last April and reported in 145 U. S. i, and nearly runs
afoul the leading case of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,
r20 U. S. 489. This latter will be remembered as the "Drummer's
Tax Case," where it was held that a law authorizing a license tax
upon drummers was unconstitutional so far as it applied to drum-
mers selling for firms located in other States, because it was in
effect a tax, not upon the drummers, but upon the houses which
they represented, and hence attempted to regulate inter-State com-
merce. In the Ficklen case, however, the question arose as to the
constitutionality of this same law so far as it authorized a tax upon
the commissions of a commission broker living in Memphis, but
doing business only for parties living outside of Tennessee. The
court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Harlan, upheld the law-
on the ground that if the tax did affect inter-State commerce, it
was so remotely and incidentally as not to amount to a regulation
of such commerce, and that the tax was really upon the property
of the broker. The Chief Justice said in the course of the opinion:
"No doubt can be entertained of the right of a State legislature
to tax trades, professions and occupations, in the absence of inhi-
bition in the State constitution in that regard; and where a resi-
dent citizen engages in general business subject to a particular
tax, the fact that the business done chances to consist for the time
being, wholly or partially in negotiating sales between resident
and non-resident merchants, of goods situated in another State,
does not necessarily involve the taxation of inter-State commerce,
forbidden by the Constitution. * * * We presume
it would not be doubted that, if the complainants had been taxed
on capital invested in the business, such taxation would not have
been obnoxious to constitutional objection, but because they had
no capital invested, the tax was ascertained by reference to the
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amount of their commissions, which, when received were no less their
property than their capital would have been." [The italics are ours.-
EDS.] We feel curious to know how the court would regard a law
authorizing a tax not in the nature of a license, but based directly
upon the sales made by a drummer.
Where a board of county commissioners entered into negoti-
ations for the purchase of a toll road and a majority of the
county electors approved of such purchase at a special election,
but the board afterwards refused to complete the purchase of
the road, the Supreme Court of Indiana has held that mandamus
will not lie at the instance of the road company to compel
the board to make an order for such purpose, since the board
acts judicially in investigating and passing upon the title of
the company to the road which is the subject of purchase, and in
determining that sufficient steps have been taken to authorize it
to complete such purchase. The vote of the electors did not dis-
pense with such further action of the board, and when acting in
such judicial capacity a court will not by writ of mandamus compel
a board of commissioners to perform a judicial duty in any partic-
ular mode, or to render any particular judgment. (State ex. rel.
Dayton Gravel Road Co. v. Commissioners, 3o N. E. Rep. 892).
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